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TURNBOW V. COMMISSIONER-REJECTION OF THE
"BOOT" EXCEPTION TO A TYPE B REORGANIZATION?
The United States Supreme Court in Turnbow v. Commissioner' may
have interpreted the Internal Revenue Code to preclude the receipt of
"boot" in a non-taxable, stock for stock reorganization.3 Although the
Court was interpreting the application of Section 112 of the 1939 Code,
the decision may be decisive in the interpretation of the parallel sections
in the 1954 Code.
Grover D. Turnbow owned all of the outstanding stock of Inter-
national Dairy Supply Corporation. In 1952 he transferred all of his
International stock to Foremost Dairies, Inc. In return he received
82,375 shares, a minority interest, in Foremost. The fair market value
of the stock was $15 per share. He received, in addition, $3,000,000
cash. On his 1952 income tax return, Turnbow treated the transaction
as a capital gain, but only to the extent that he received cash, or "boot."
The Commissioner proposed a deficiency, contending that the whole
gain was recognizable.
The case presents a problem of interpretation of three statutory
sections which are part of the corporate reorganization provisions of
the income tax law. Both the 1939 and 1954 Codes define such "re-
organizations" in technical terms. The definitions are in paragraphs
which happen to be designated by the capital letters A, B, C, D, E and
F. In popular tax law parlance, the respective definitions are referred
to as Type A, B, C, D, etc., reorganizations. Four types of reorganiza-
tions concern corporate combinations in which one corporation emerges
as the "owner" of the businesses conducted previously by both. Thus,
Type A refers to combinations created by statutory merger or consoli-
dation; Type B to acquisitions by trading stock for stock; and Types
C and D to acquisitions of assets in exchange for stock. Types E and F
involve recapitalizations and mere changes in identity, form or place
of organization of a corporation and have little relevance to the prob-
lem involved in Turnbow. The taxpayer in Turnbow attempted to
establish his transaction as a Type B reorganization.
1368 U.S. 337 (1961).
2 ~oney or "other" property received as consideration in addition to the shares of
stock in the corporation which was a party to the transaction. See, 3 MERTExs, FEDERAL
INcomm TAXATION § 20.147 (1957).
3 The tax bar has adopted the term "Type B reorganization!' as a shorthand method
of referring to a reorganization under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 112(b)
(3), which section was carried over into the 1954 Code as § 368(a) (1) (B).
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The problem presented involves the interpretation of the following
three statutory sections:
(g) Definition of reorganization. As used in this section . . .
(1) The term "reorganization" means . . . (b) the acquisition by
one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock,
of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another
corporation;'
Stock for stock on reorganization. No gain or loss shall be recognized
if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or
securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the
reorganization. 5
Gains from exchanges not solely in kind. (1) If an exchange would
be within the provisions of subsection (b) (1), (2), (3) or (5) or
within the provisions of subsection (1), of this section if it were not
for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only of
property permitted by such paragraph or by subsection (1) to be re-
ceived without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but
in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair
market value of such other property.6
The first two of these sections clearly establish two propositions,
first, that an exchange of shares in one corporation solely for con-
trolling shares in another corporation is a reorganization and, second,
that such a transaction results in no recognized gain for income tax
purposes. Thus taxpayer Turnbow admittedly could have disposed of
his controlling shares solely in exchange for shares of Foremost Dairies
without incurring any immediate tax liability. Alternatively, the same
result could have been accomplished by a statutory merger or consoli-
dation which would have satisfied the requirements of a Type A
reorganization.
Since the transaction was cast as a Type B reorganization the Com-
missioner's determination of a deficiency was appealed to the Tax
Court. The Tax Court decided in Turnbow's favor.7 In doing so it
followed its own early decision in Bonkam v. Commissioner8 and the
4 INT. REV. CoDE oF 1939, § 112 (g) (1).
5 INT. Rm. CoDE oF 1939, § 112(b) (3).
0 INT. REV. CoDE OF 1939, § 112(c) (1).
7 Turnbow v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 646 (1959). Noted 73 HARV. L. Rzv. 1402
(1960).
833 B.T.A. 1100 (1936). (transfer of stock to a second corporation for cash and
stock of the latter corporation: Held, § 112(c) (1) is applicable and the gain is limited
to an amount not exceeding the cash payment.)
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Seventh Circuit determination in Howard v. Commissioner.' Further,
the Tax Court looked to its longstanding and continuous construction
of Section 112(c) (1) and the regulations ° promulgated under it as
being determinative." The court held that, "but for the cash received
.. .the exchange would have met the 'solely' requirement of section
112(g) (1) (B) and fallen within section 112(b) (3). ' '12
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit that court placed heavy emphasis
upon the legislative history of the 1934 amendment to Section 112(g)
(1).Y The court concluded:
".. . if the "solely for voting stock" requirement of (B) and (C)
reorganizations is to be given the effect intended by Congress, § 112(c)
cannot operate to render a stock-plus-boot acquisition a (B) or (C)
reorganization through a disregard of the existence of boot. In the case
before us, then, the existence of boot prevents §112(g) (1) (B) from
applying; since no reorganization exists, § 112(b) (3) cannot apply;
§ 112(c) is then also inapplicable.' 4 (Emphasis added.)
Certiorari was granted in order to resolve the conflict between the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits."5 The Supreme Court based its affirmance
9 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956). The petitioners and other shareholders held 80.19%
of all the shares. They received only voting stock in exchange for their shares. The
other shareholders received cash for their shares. The court specifically held that§ 112(b) (3) was inaplicable, but under § 112(c) (1) gain is recognized to the
extent of the cash received. Since the taxpayers in question had received no cash they
therefore had no recognized gain.
The decision was subjected to strong criticism, i.e., "the interpretation . . .appears
to make a shambles of the statutory requirements for a 'B' or 'C' reorganization ....
[R]estrictions in these provisions in effect are abolished through that interpretation,
and the position of the Court of Appeals seems to be of highly questionable validity."
3 ME, TENs, FERA INcomE TAXATION § 20.147 n.84a (1957).
10Especially Treas. Regs. 118 § 39.112(g)--4 "Exchanges in reorganization for
stock or securities and other property or money. (a) If in an exchange of stock or
securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, for stock or securities in the same corporation or in another corporation
a party to the reorganization, there is received by the taxpayer other property (not
permitted to be received without the recognition of gain) or money, then(1) As provided in section 112(c) (1), the gain, if any, to the taxpayer will be
recognized in an amount not in excess of the sum of money and the fair market value
of the other property, ....
Example. A, in connection with a reorganization, in 1952, exchanges a share of
stock in the X Corporation purchased in 1929 at a cost of $100 for a share of stock in
the Y Corporation (a party to the reorganization), which has a fair market value of$90, plus $20 in cash. The gain from the transaction is $10 and is recognized and taxed
as a gain from the exchange of property .....
The Tax Court felt the regulations had been approved by Congress since they were
of long standing and Congress had reenacted the Internal Revenue Code several times
during their life. See Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952), and I-elvering v.
Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
11 Turnbow v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 646, 652 (1959).
12 Id. at 652-53.
s Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669, 672-674 (1960).
14 Id. at 675.
15 Turnbow v. Commissioner, 366 U.S. 923 (1961).
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of the Ninth Circuit decision, not upon the legislative history'6 but
upon a requirement that "an actual 'reorganization,' as defined in §
112(g) (1) and used in § 112(b) (3), must exist before § 112(c) (1)
can apply thereto ."7 Thus the Court disposed of the case by a simple
and limited5 exercise of statutory construction and required a literal
compliance with the statutory definition of a reorganization.
The prospective effect of Turnbow is to give vitality to the Com-
missioner's contention that § 356(a) will not carve out an exception
to the "solely for stock" requirement of § 368(a) (1) (B) because
these parallel sections were enacted in 1954 without substantial change
from the 1939 Code sections. While the decision was expressly limited
to the case before it,'" the approach taken by the Court to the statutory
interpretation problem will certainly carry a great deal of weight with
courts which may be called upon in the future to analyze the interplay
between § 356(a) and § 368(a) (1) (B)." This attitude will probably
also carry over into the interpretation placed on the Type C reorgani-
zation in similar circumstances."
The Supreme Court decision in Turnbow does leave several ques-
tions unanswered. (1) How limited is the holding?22 (2) What effect
will the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 have?"
(3) To what extent will changes in the 1954 Code provisions be influ-
16 Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337, 344 n.8 (1961), "The legislative history,
much of which is set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, though tending to
support our decision, is inconctusive, and no more can fairly be said of the Commis-
sioner's Regulations. See Treas. Regs. 118, §§ 39.112 (c)-1 (e), 39.112(g)-4, 39.112(g)-
1(c)." (Emphasis added.) This note disposed of the argument advanced by the Tax
Court based upon longstanding construction of the regulations. See note 10 supra and
accompanying text.
17 Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337, 343 (1961).
18 "[A]n exchange of stock and cash-approximately 30 percentum in stock and 70
percentum in cash-for 'at least 80 per centum of the... stock of another corporation
cannot be a 'reorganization' . . . and thus § 112(c) (1) cannot be applicable to pe-
titioner's transaction. That holding determines this case and is all we decide!" Id. at 344.
(Emphasis added.)
11 Ibid.
20 One author views the issue raised by Turubow as, "what circumstances are re-
quired to have a Section 368(a) (1) (B) reorganization." CCH FDERAL TAXATIoN
829 (1962).
21 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C) defines "reorganization" as: "(C) the
acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock(or in an exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corporation which is
in control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all of the properties of another
corporation, but in determining whether the exchange is solely for stock the assumption
by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or the fact that property acquired
is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded ;"
22 See note 18 supra. Compare Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S.
194, 198 (1942). "'Solely' leaves no leeway. Voting stock plus some other considera-
tion does not meet the statutory [Type 'B'] requirement."
23 The Senate Report on the 1954- Internal Revenue Act on § 356 specifically rejected
the attempt by "section 306 of the House Bill -of correlating 'boot' distributions made
incident to a corporate reorganization -and property distributions generally... ." 3 U.S.
610 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [VoL. 37
ential?24 Until these questions are resolved it is safe to assume only
that § 356(a) will apply solely to a Type A reorganization.25 Section
368 (a) (1) (A) places no restriction upon the type of consideration
which is to pass between the parties to the statutory merger or con-
solidation. Because of the wide variety of governing state statutes, no
accurate generalization can be attempted regarding the availability of
this method, although it is not without possible pitfalls."
The caution which should follow Turnbow may not prove to be a
substantial obstacle to planning in all cases, for the proposed trans-
action may still be planned and cast in a different form. Suggested
alternatives may be: (1) The receipt of "solely stock" followed by its
later sale. 7 (2) The acquiring corporation may, over the twelve months
previous to the "solely stock" reorganization, acquire shares for cash. 8
(3) The transfer or shareholder may obtain a favorable employment
contract or a covenant not to compete with the acquiring corporation. -
(4) The prohibition against assuming liabilities should not prevent the
acquiring corporation from either assuming a restricted stock option
or substituting one under § 421 (g).1o
The decision by the Supreme Court in Turnbow should have the
effect of making the tax practioner eliminate the use of "boot" in
planning a Type B reorganization until the interplay between § 356(a)
and § 368(a) (1) (B) is resolved. The alternative to "don't" is to
attempt to plan the affairs of the taxpayer to utilize an alternative
form for the transaction.
F. ROBERT DEBRUYN
Code Congressional and Administrative News 4906, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 1954. The
Senate Report was adopted on this section. Further the Senate Report states: "Receipt
of additional consideration.-Where a capitalization or other type of corporate reorgani-
zation occurs, a shareholder may receive money or other property, known as 'boot,' in
addition to the stock or securities which may be received without the recognition of
gain. Your committee's bill follows the House bill and existing law in not disqualifying
the transaction as a whole as a tax-free exchange, but the 'boot' is subject to the tax."
Id. at 4682. (Emphasis added.) This sweeping inclusion of present law and the rejection
of the House change is certainly broad enough to incorporate the then existing Tax
Court interpretation of 112(c) (1) and "boot." See Bonham v. Commissioner, 33
B.T.A. 1100 (1936).
This argument does have another side. What negative inferences arise from: (1)
the change embodied in the type "C" reorganization under the 1954 Code and (2) the
recommendations of an Advisory Group in 1958 to allow the receipt of up to 50%, of the
consideration in "boot." A bill embodying this latter recommendation was introduced
but was not enacted. H.R. No. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 26 (1959). See, Note 73
HAgv. L. Rzv. 1402 (1960) and Greene, Proposed Definitional Changes h Reorganiza-
tions, 14 TAx L. Ray. 155, 160 (1959).
24 In addition to the legislative history discussed in the preceding note, what will be
the effect of the explicit cross sectional reference in § 354(a) (3) and the Regulations
enacted under § 356, especially Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1 (c) Example (1) ?25 Assuming that Turnbow is a denial of its use in a "B" or "C" reorganization.
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26 See BiTTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS,
362-63 (1959).27 See generally, McDonald & Willard, Tax Free Acquisitions and Distribution,
N.Y.U. 14TH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 859 (1956).
2 A negative implication may arise from Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (c) ... an acquisi-
tion is permitted tax-free in a single transaction or in a series of transactions taking
place over a relatively short period of time such as 12 months."
20 McDonald and Willard, supra note 27 at 877.
30 Ibid.
